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Journal of the American Oriental Society 120.2 (2000)

The Way of Water and Sprouts of Virtue. By SARAHALLAN.
SUNY Series in Chinese Philosophy and Culture. Albany:
OFNEWYORKPRESS,1997. Pp. xiv +
STATEUNIVERSITY
181 + illus. $53.50 (cloth); $17.95 (paper).
Sarah Allan, in The Wayof Waterand Sprouts of Virtue, explores the premise that linguistic concepts are rooted in culturally specific imagery. Allan argues that in the process of
translation the target language inevitably grafts its own imagery onto the concepts of the original language. Therefore the
translation process fails to capture the range of meaning and
the structuralrelations between terms in the original language.
Allan's work elaborates this point via an analysis of the meta-

phors related to water and plants in early Chinese philosophical
thought.
Allen's thesis is that "in the absence of a transcendentalconcept, the ancient Chinese turned directly to the natural world"
to explicate their ideas (p. xii). The frame of the book mimics
her thesis that water and plants are the formative metaphors of
early Chinese thought. Allan argues first that water images,
in various forms, predominantly serve to describe the cosmos.
Next, she explores how plants serve to illustrate the specifically
human aspect of the cosmos. Within this frameworkAllan proceeds "from the concrete to the abstract"-first presenting the
range of meaning of the metaphors,then offering an interpretation of their use by individual thinkers, focusing on the Mencius and the Laozi.
Allan's work on imagery sheds light on obscure passages in
early Chinese texts. For example, pointing out that the xin (heart/
mind) resembles a pool of water (p. 82), Allan illuminates
Mencius' analogy in 7A.24 between the way of water and the
way a gentleman's mind does not "penetrate."Similarly, noting
that qi (energy/matter) is vaporized water, Allan uses terms
from descriptions of how Yu controlled the great flood to explain Xunzi's treatmentof qi in "Yue Lun" (p. 92). With regard
to plant imagery, Allan makes the interesting general point that
in early China people belonged to a category that included both
plants and animals (wanwu), rather than a category including
animals but distinct from plants.
Because her book is a structuralanalysis of shared features
of early Chinese thought, Allan's approach tends to highlight
similarities. However, she also distinguishes distinctive uses of
imagery in the work of differentthinkers.For example, she notes
that the Laozi and the Zhuangzi use the "qi=water"metaphor
differently. She writes: "Ratherthan concentrating one's mind/
heart and clarifying the qi, as in the Laozi, or directing the qi in
channels, the Zhuangzi advocates free movement" (p. 92).
Although her arguments are generally sound, some of Allan's interpretationsmight benefit from furtherexplanation. She
seems, for instance, to take any reference to "flowing" (liu fL)
as a reference to water, as if other things, such as breezes,
can only count as "flowing" insofar as they resemble water. In
her comment on the Laozi 61, which reads, "A large state is
the lower reaches [xia liu]," she supplies "[of a river]," which
begs the question of whether the reference is to water. In discussing the same phrase for "lower reaches" (xia liu) that appears in the Analects 19.20, she again interprets the phrase in
terms of water imagery, and translatesthe reference to "returning" (gui) in the passage as "flow" (p. 47). In some cases when
Allan sees "clear" water metaphors,the reader needs more explanation to be persuaded. Where the Laozi says, "I do nothing
and yet the people are transformedof themselves, I am fond of
stillness and the people correct themselves," she provides only
the comment, "here the water metaphor is particularly clear"
(p. 117).
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On the same lines, sometimes Allan's metaphoricalanalyses
lead to claims that seem inaccuratewithout furtherelaboration.
For example, she claims that de "is something peculiar to people, an aspect of their hearts that other living things do not
have" (p. 101). If she means by this that other living things cannot be said to have de, then she needs to account for Analects
14.33 which says "A good horse is praisedfor its de." In another
case, Allan takes the xin (heart/mind)to be a container organ,
rather than a locus for the performance of a certain function
(p. 85). Allan interpretsthe characterfor xin as a picture of the
heart/mind as an organ. Based on a bronze inscription that
speaks of "clarifying the mind/heartand revealing the de," she
concludes that the xin itself is not only an organ, but a receptacle for de. But even if the character for xin is in fact a picture
of an organ, there is little evidence that early Chinese thinkers
viewed the xin as a receptacle. Containers are not the only
things that, when clarified, reveal something. Water metaphors
for the xin emphasize water's ability to reflect, rather than the
pool containing the water. Moreover, as it stands, Allan's use of
the heart/mindas "organ-containing-de"metaphoris not a convincing explanation of the claim in Zhuangzi 5/42-45 that de
fails to shape a hideous person's body. The reference in the
Zhuangzi is to de failing to shape the form, not failing to shape
the heart/mind.
Allan's contention that water and plant metaphorssignify the
passage of time is one of the more controversial aspects of the
book. She convincingly notes that in Analects 9.17 the passage of water (shi 'T) implies what we mean by the passage of
time. However, extending that connection between water and
time to a connection between dao and time in the Zhuangzi
seems unjustified. Allan contends that in the Zhuangzi, "the
dao clearly comes to incorporate that amorphous ungraspable
aspect of life: what we call time" (p. 78). To make her point,
she suggests that in the Zhuangzi people are "in" the dao, that
it is shapeless and invisible, and that it is humanity's natural
habitat, as water is to fish (pp. 77-79). From these descriptions,
one might just as well conclude that the dao (or daos) in the
Zhuangzi are spatial rather than temporal metaphors. Aside
from the reference to dao as humanity'shabitat (which implies
that the dao is something other than water, since we are not
fish), the argumentseems strangely disconnected from the root
metaphors that ground Allan's more successful claims elsewhere in the text.
By focusing discussion on the claim that we think in metaphor, Allan re-opens a significant philosophical discussion to
which sinologists rarely attend. Following A. C. Graham,Allan
takes the position that languages (or their "conceptualschemes")
are never completely commensurable: "We can... never entirely comprehend another conceptual scheme" (p. 18). Such a
position implies that truthis relative to different languages, insofar as it allows the possibility that a proposition, true in one
language, can be false in another. But Allan attempts to avoid
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such relativistic conclusions, by claiming a proposition's truth
can only be affirmed or denied in its own language. She uses
Graham'ssample sentence, "cao qing ye" and notes that it does
not entail the truth or falsity of the English equivalent translation "grass is green." But such an argument does not thereby
evade the specter of relativism lurking behind any claim that
languages are truly incommensurable. The argumentthat these
two sentences are true or false only with respect to their own
language capitalizes on the breadthor vagueness of the Chinese
terms. "Cao" could be straw, plants, or herbs. "Qing" could be
dark, cool, or wet. Thus the argumentcan draw the conclusion
that "cao qing ye" may be true or false without entailing that
"grass is green" be likewise. But just as "cao qing ye" is too
broad to map precisely onto "grass is green," so too "grass is
green" is itself too broadto be affirmedor denied. (Grass is not
always green.) To constitute a genuine contributionto the debate
about linguistic incommensurability,the argument requires a
more specific proposition-"this grass is green,"for instancewhere the referent is clearly identifiable to the language-users.
That is, to raise the problem of whether or not languages are incommensurable in any philosophically significant way, one
needs to find a case where the language users agree upon a
specific "fact"to which the propositionrefers, in light of which
the language users can affirmor deny the proposition. (Donald
Davidson'ssample sentence, "it'sraining,"illustratesthis.) Allan
is to be credited for discussing these questions, but comparing
vague sentences does not refute the argumentthat the notion of
incommensurableconceptual schemes leads to the relativity of
truthclaims.
By investigating the extent to which metaphor-analysis is
necessary for philosophical understanding,Allan's work opens
the question of how the early Chinese themselves viewed language's functioning. She notes that Chinese characters do not
generally represent "objects or ideas," but that in their origin
many characters"reflect ... ideas" (pp. 32-33). However, since
her ensuing discussion frequently mentions characters that are
"pictographs"in her terms, it would be helpful to hear why she
does not think such charactersreflect "objects,"and what count
as "objects" and "ideas,"both in her terms and in those of the
early Chinese.
While the author's individual analyses are not always convincing, this book succeeds in clarifying the significanceof a vast
range of water and plant symbolism in early Chinese thought.
More importantly,it succeeds in demonstratingthe need for such
a method in comparing philosophies.
JANE M. GEANEY
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND

